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Regulators express growing concern over “predatory lending,” which we take to mean
lending that reduces the expected utility of borrowers. We present a rational model of
consumer credit in which such lending is possible, and we identify the circumstances in
which it arises with and without competition. Predatory lending is associated with
imperfect competition, highly collateralized loans, and poorly informed borrowers.
Under most circumstances competition among lenders eliminates predatory lending.“While Georgia’s real estate foreclosure law has remained essentially the
same since the 1880s, mortgage lending has changed dramatically during
the past two decades...Leagues of homeowners are tapping into their equity
to pay oﬀ credit cards, buy cars and take trips...One bump in the road —
a job loss, a sick child, a divorce — could introduce homeowners to the
harsh realities of Georgia’s foreclosure law.”
“Swift foreclosures dash American dream,” Atlanta Jour-
nal and Constitution, January 30, 2005
“Any time you’re looking at equity rather than ability to repay, you’re
approaching predatory lending.” (Attorney Daniel J. Mulligan, whose
law ﬁrm, Jenkins & Mulligan, San Francisco, is a member of the National
Association of Consumer Advocates.)
“How unscrupulous lenders prey on the vulnerable,”
San Francisco Chronicle, July 15, 2001.
1 Introduction
Many states have new laws combating “predatory lending.” This term has yet to
acquire a precise deﬁnition, but judging from the content and discussion of the laws,
it means lending that brings expected harm to borrowers. But this begs the question:
How do such loans arise in the ﬁrst place, when borrowing is voluntary?
The answer turns on what borrowers understand. If borrowers misunderstand their
loan contracts, then the potential for predatory lending is immediate, limited only by
the depth of borrowers’ misunderstanding and the depravity of their lenders. Existing
analyses of predatory lending have taken this confused-borrowers view, and recent
legislation appears to take it as well. By this view, a combination of borrower
education and clearer loan documents could, in principle, eradicate predation. But
the literature has yet to consider the scope for predation of rational borrowers. In this
paper we address predation in a fully rational economy, where borrowers understand
their loan contracts. Thus, our analysis bounds the eﬃcacy of combatting predation
through education.
How can lending bring expected harm to rational borrowers who understand their
contracts? We take predatory lending to mean lending that causes expected harm
conditional on the union of the borrower’s and lender’s information. Under this
1deﬁnition, predation can arise when a lender has extra, private information about a
borrower’s prospects. Lenders enjoy this informational advantage if borrowers would
learn something about the distribution of their own loans’ outcomes from observing
the realized outcomes of many similar loans. Considering that the typical consumer
loan is made by a lender who sees the ex ante circumstances and ex post outcomes
of very many other loans – for example, the top 10 mortgage lenders accounted for
61 percent of originations in 2003 (Pafenberg [23]) – this informational advantage is
likely to be big. And it would persist even if borrowers learned their credit scores,
such as FICO scores, because these scores reﬂect only a small subset of relevant data,
omitting all income and asset data and some signiﬁcant but legally oﬀ-bounds credit
data (see, e.g., Musto [22]).1
Much of the concern surrounding predatory lending relates to circumstances under
which a borrower’s home is at risk in the event of default. House-purchase mortgages
and home equity loans both fall within this category. Critics of banks’ behavior in
subprime lending markets suggest that borrowers misjudge their true probability of
default and lose their homes in foreclosure, while lenders know the true odds but
recover enough in foreclosure that they lend anyhow. Because foreclosure brings
costs to borrowers without oﬀsetting beneﬁts to lenders, excess foreclosure — if it
arises — threatens both wealth distribution and economic eﬃciency.
For predation to occur in equilibrium, it must be that, if some borrowers underes-
timate their foreclosure risk, there must be other borrowers receiving the same loan
terms who overestimate their foreclosure risk, because otherwise the loan terms would
prove to the underestimating borrowers that they should not take the loans. Further-
more, it must be optimal for the lender to oﬀer the same terms to both types, rather
then lend to the two types on diﬀerent terms, or just to one type. That is, predatory
lending requires pooling.
A simple model captures the important elements of the problem. On the borrowing
side are homeowners who derive private beneﬁts from their homes, and who wish to
borrow against them. On the lending side are creditors who can privately distinguish
between homeowners with good and bad prospects for repayment, and who foreclose
if not fully repaid. Because liquidation is costly and does not capture the private
beneﬁts, it carries a deadweight cost. Lenders oﬀer loan terms to borrowers, and
1Even if borrowersare unable to learn anything about their futures from their lenders’ experiences,
this informational advantage could still prevail under bounded rationality. In particular, if borrowers
are less able than lenders to process available information about their future prospects, then lenders
enjoy the same advantage. Our analysis is consistent with both interpretations of the informational
advantage; what is key is that the borrower and lender know that the advantage exists.
2we say that predatory lending occurs if homeowners accept terms that make them
worse oﬀ in expectation. We identify the equilibria of two economies, one with a
monopolistic lender, and one with multiple competing lenders.
With a monopolist lender, we ﬁnd that borrowers with low expected incomes are ex-
posed to predatory lending when they have large equity stakes in their homes. These
equilibria are robust to standard reﬁnement concepts. Moreover, loans used to cre-
ate additional collateral, such as home-improvement and house purchase loans, are
particularly susceptible to predation. Introducing competition between lenders mit-
igates predatory lending. However, loans that are fully collateralized remain at risk
from predation when lending to borrowers with bad prospects is socially ineﬃcient.
While we do not argue that all borrowing is fully rational, the predictions of our
benchmark rational model correspond well to common impressions of the problem,
namely that predation is associated with weak competition, strong asymmetric in-
formation and high home equity. Thus, we argue that this model provides a useful
framework for exploring the dynamics of predatory lending, and we conclude the pa-
per by exploring the equilibrium eﬀects of prominent legislative interventions in the
consumer credit market.
Related Literature
Previous studies of predatory lending have generally stressed the combination of wilful
misrepresentation by the lender and the borrower’s inability to understand the true
terms of the loan. Engel and McCoy [11], Renuart [25], and Silverman [30] are
representative examples. Richardson [26] presents a formal model in which borrowers
know that some lenders will deceive them, and this aﬀects their decision to apply for
credit; but once they have approached a dishonest lender, there is nothing they can do
to avoid being taken advantage of. Predatory lending is often viewed as a subcategory
of subprime lending, which is itself the object of study of a large literature — see,
e.g., Crews-Cutts and Van Order [8], and Calem et al. [5], for recent contributions.
A number of studies by policy groups have tried to empirically assess the scope
of predatory lending. For example, ACORN Fair Housing’s study of Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania, [1] documents the fraction of foreclosed loans that have high
interest rates, balloon payments and pre-payment penalty clauses. A recent working
paper by Hanson and Morgan [15] also addresses the signiﬁcance of predatory lending.
After ﬁrst presenting a behavioral model in which lenders exaggerate households’ fu-
3ture income in order to increase loan demand,2 the authors attempt to detect preda-
tory lending by payday lenders3 by examining whether borrowers without college
degrees and/or uncertain income are disproportionately more likely to be delinquent
in states that are more permissive of payday loans.
More generally, our paper bears some relation to the extensive literature on com-
petition for partially informed consumers. Prominent contributions include (but are
certainly not limited to) Stigler [31], Salop and Stiglitz [28], Wilde and Schwartz [33],
and Varian [32]. Subsequent papers, such as those of Beales et al. [3] and Schwartz
and Wilde [29], have sought to draw policy implications from these formal analyses.
A recent article by Hynes and Posner [16] surveys a variety of issues related to the
regulation of consumer ﬁnance, including the application of these models to the spe-
ciﬁc context of consumer loans. Ausubel [2] presents evidence that competition fails
to eliminate proﬁts in the credit card market, and sketches a model in which some
borrowers are irrational and ignore the possibility that they will actually borrow using
credit cards.
A central assumption in all these papers is that consumers are not fully and cost-
lessly informed about the prices oﬀered by all competing ﬁrms. This assumption
can generate cases in which prices do not fall to a fully competitive level; but it
cannot generate circumstances in which a consumer’s welfare is actually reduced by
purchasing a good. In contrast, in our model borrowers fully observe the interest
rates oﬀered to them; instead, it is their own future income process about which they
are imperfectly informed. On an abstract level this assumption is isomorphic to
borrowers not knowing their own preferences. In this regard, our paper shares some
common ground with recent papers on competition for behavioral consumers: see,
for example, Ausubel [2], Manove and Padilla [19], Della Vigna and Malmendier [17],
and Gabaix and Laibson [13].
Finally, as we have discussed above, the key assumption in our model is that (at least
in some respects) the lender knows more about a borrower’s future income than does
the borrower himself. A growing literature, which dates back at least as far as Rock
[27], has studied various aspects of the “informed investor” environment.4
2In contrast to the existing paper, borrowers are assumed to be unable to infer any useful infor-
mation from the terms of the loan contract.
3For the costs associated with running a payday lending operation, see Flannery and Samolyk
[12].
4For recent examples in the speciﬁc context of credit, see Manove et al. [20], Garmaise [14],
Bernhardt and Krasa [4], and Inderst and Mueller [18].
4Paper Outline
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
the incidence of predatory lending under monopolistic lending conditions. Section
4 then explores the eﬀect of increased competition on the possibility of predation.
In Section 5 we extend our basic model to cover home-improvement loans, and show
that (consistent with public concern) these are particularly prone to predation. For
a variety of reasons consumer credit markets are highly regulated; Section 6 analyzes
the impact of three high proﬁle legislative interventions. Section 7 concludes. All
proofs omitted in the main text are given in Appendix A.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
As noted above, concern about predatory lending focuses on situations in which a
borrower’s home is repossessed upon default. We present a highly stylized model
of home-equity loans — that is, loans in which a borrower uses an equity-stake in
his home as collateral for a new loan, often for consumption purposes. Much of our
analysis applies with little alteration to the other main case of interest, namely loans
made for the purpose of the initial house purchase. As we will argue in Section 5,
if anything we are biasing our analysis against generating predation by focusing on
consumption loans that do not create additional collateral.
Basic Setup
All agents are risk neutral and require an expected return of at least 0. Borrowers
have no money but have the opportunity to spend L on a project that delivers a
gross non-monetary beneﬁt in one period of L + S. Examples include health care,
children’s education, weddings, travel, and just general consumption. In one period,
each borrower will receive, independently of undertaking the project, stochastic in-
come of y ∈ {0,I}. In addition to the income, each borrower has collateral, which we
will refer to as his house, that is worth H to the borrower and that sells for H − X,
where X < H. The diﬀerence X is the social cost of foreclosure: the combination
of the lender’s costs of foreclosing on the house5 and the borrower’s private beneﬁts
5One estimate puts the cost of foreclosure at just less than $60,000 for loans that go through the
full formal process: see Crews Cutts and Green [7].
5from his house, such as the adaptation of the rest of his life to living there.
Lenders have unlimited funds, so they will lend L if they expect repayment of at least
L. Throughout, we restrict attention to debt contracts, which are deﬁned by their
face value F. We assume throughout that the high-income realization I exceeds the
face values of all equilibrium loan contracts, so that the lender is always repaid F
when y = I. On the other hand, in the low-income realization the borrower is forced
to sell his house for H −X. (Equivalently, the lender seizes the house.) In this case,
if H − X ≥ F, the lender receives F and the borrower is left with H −X − F; while
if instead H −X < F then the lender receives H −X and the borrower is left with 0.
Note that since in our setting the borrower never takes a loan from more than one
lender, it is irrelevant whether or not the loan is explicitly secured by the house.
That is, even if the lender makes an unsecured loan, he ultimately still has the right
to attach any wealth belonging to a borrower who has defaulted.
The order of events is as follows. After having received a signal about the borrower’s
type (see below), the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to lend L to the borrower
for a promised repayment F. The borrower either borrows at these terms, spending
it on the project, or does not borrow. When there are multiple lenders, they make
simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers (see Section 4).
Information Structure
As discussed, a key element of our model is that lenders are better informed about
the income prospects of borrowers than are the borrowers themselves. Formally,
while a borrower thinks there is a probability p that he will receive income y = I,
each lender receives an informative signal σ ∈ {g,b}. If the lender observes signal
σ = b (respectively, σ = g), the borrower’s actual probability of income y = I is pb
(respectively, pg).
Comments
1. One possible way in which the probabilities p, pb and pg are related is as follows.
A fraction θ of borrowers are type G; for these borrowers, there is a probability
πG that y = I. The remaining fraction 1 − θ are type B, and have probability
πB < πG of income y = I. Conditional on this public information, the probabil-
6ity that a borrower collects y = I is p ≡ θπG+(1 − θ)πB. The signals received
by lenders are (possibly noisy) indicators of a borrower’s type. So conditional
on both the public information and the lender’s signal σ ∈ {g,b}, the probability
that a borrower gets y = I is pσ = Pr(π = πG|σ)πG + Pr(π = πB|σ)πB.6
2. The lender’s informational advantage is most plausibly interpreted as stemming
from the observation of how a large number of previous borrowers have fared.
The lender acquires this information, without cost, as part and parcel of its core
business. Although in principle a borrower could conceivably collect this same
information, the costs of doing so are almost certain to exceed the beneﬁt for
an individual borrower.7
3. Many plausible scenarios are consistent with this formal framework. Examples
include:
(a) Borrowers work in one of several sectors. These sectors will be diﬀeren-
tially aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks. For instance, the steel industry
may be more aﬀected by exchange rate ﬂuctuations than the food industry.
Lenders understand these correlations, but borrowers do not.
(b) Borrowers belong to diﬀerent demographic groups. Similar to above, dif-
ferent groups may be diﬀerentially aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks.
(c) The income that matters in our model is disposable income, i.e., total in-
come net of essential expenditures. Borrowers from diﬀerent demographic
and/or geographic groups may have diﬀerent probabilities of experiencing
a rise in essential expenditure. For example, the probability of large health
expenditures may be much greater for 70-year-old men than for 65-year-old
men.
If the lender observes σ = g then we say that the borrower has good prospects,
and we refer interchangeably to lending after signal g and lending to good prospects.
6For example, in the speciﬁc case in which Pr(π = πG|σ = g) = Pr(π = πB|σ = b) = 1−ε, then
pg =
θ(1 − ε)πG + (1 − θ)επB
θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε
pb =
θεπG + (1 − θ)(1 − ε)πB
θε + (1 − θ)(1 − ε)
.
7Even if a borrower did succeed in collecting the relevant information, he/she would still have
to correctly interpret it. This is not a trivial exercise. Large lending banks employ highly trained
statisticians to perform this task. As such, our informational asymmetry can also be interpreted as
a manifestation of bounded rationality.
7Analogously, after σ = b the borrower has bad prospects, and lending after signal b
is equivalent to lending to bad prospects.
Obviously, it is plausible that borrowers also have private information of their own.
However, to isolate the eﬀects of the informational superiority of the lenders we focus
on the case in which lenders know strictly more than borrowers.
Predatory Lending Deﬁned
Our question for the model is whether predatory lending arises in equilibrium. This
requires a working deﬁnition. The essence of predatory lending is expected harm: a
predatory loan reduces the lender’s expectation of the borrower’s utility. Thus, we say
that an equilibrium features predation of bad prospects (respectively, good prospects),
if, conditional on the lender observing signal b (respectively, signal g), a borrower
is made worse oﬀ in expectation by accepting the lender’s oﬀer. To reiterate, the
expectation here is conditional on the lender’s information σ.8
Another question for the model is whether predatory lending causes harm to society,
rather than just to the borrower. To address this question, we refer to lending that
causes net harm to society as socially ineﬃcient, as opposed to socially eﬃcient,
and if lending after observing σ is socially ineﬃcient we say that an equilibrium in
which such loans are accepted features strong predation after signal σ. Note that such
loans would have to be harmful to the borrower since the lender would not be losing
expected value conditional on his own information. Predation that is not strong we
call weak.
Predation of bad prospects involves borrowers suﬀering from defaulting more than
they expect, and predation of good prospects involves borrowers suﬀering from re-
paying their loans more than they expect. Both types capture public concerns with
consumer lending: the former captures the concern that foreclosure is excessive, and
the latter captures the concern that consumers are treated as riskier than they are,
e.g. treated as subprime when in fact they are prime.
8Our deﬁnition of predatory lending begs the question of whether predation would be eliminated
if the lender simply threw away all his information. However, clearly in a richer model a completely
uninformed lender would be unable to proﬁtably provide credit. Speciﬁcally, suppose that along
with bad and good prospects, there is also a third group, terrible prospects, who are numerous and
unproﬁtable to lend to, and whom the lender can distinguish from the other types only by becoming
informed.
83 Monopoly Lending
In this section we identify and characterize the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria of the monopolist-lender economy. For this purpose we need ﬁrst to establish the
relevant boundaries: the boundary between social eﬃciency and ineﬃciency, and for
each agent, the boundary between entering the loan and staying put. We derive these
boundaries, use them to identify necessary conditions for eﬃciency and predation,
and then solve for the equilibria.
Social Eﬃciency of Lending
A loan delivers surplus S to the borrower in both the income and no-income states,
and also destroys X in the no-income state. As such, lending after signal σ is strictly
socially eﬃcient if and only if S > (1 − pσ)X. For use below, likewise note that
uninformed lending would be strictly socially eﬃcient if and only if S > (1 − p)X.
If lenders and borrowers had the same information we would never see socially inef-
ﬁcient loans, because someone’s expectations must be negative. But when borrowers
base expectations on less information, this logic no longer applies; the borrower’s
expectations for himself will not be negative, but that does not stop the lender’s
expectations for the borrower from going negative.
Borrowers’ Break-even Face Values and their Properties
Consider ﬁrst a borrower who in equilibrium does not learn the lender’s signal about
him. If he does not accept a loan then he keeps his house for sure, and gets income I
if the income state obtains. Thus, his reservation utility is H +pI. If he does accept
a loan of L with face value F, then he obtains a non-monetary utility of L + S. Of
course, he must also repay the loan. If his income is high he can aﬀord to make
the payment F, and so keeps his house: his total payoﬀ is L + S + H + I − F. On
the other hand, if his income is low he cannot aﬀord to make the payment F, and
so loses his house: his total payoﬀ is L + S + max{0,H − X − F}. We denote the
highest face value acceptable to a borrower who does not learn the lender’s signal by
F D, which is deﬁned implicitly by the indiﬀerence equation
L + S + p(H + I − F
D) + (1 − p)max
￿
0,H − X − F
D￿





p if H − (L + S) < pX
L + S − (1 − p)X otherwise
. (2)
As we have stressed, the borrower does not directly observe the lender’s signal σ.
However, he may learn the signal in equilibrium. In this case, the highest face value
he is prepared to pay on the loan depends on the signal. We denote these reservation
face values by F D
b and F D
g ; algebraically they take the same form as expression (2),
with p simply replaced by pb and pg respectively.
The relative values of F D
g , F D and F D
b are central to predatory lending because they
determine whether it is good or bad prospects who might accept a welfare-reducing
loan. If F D
g > F D > F D
b then a face value F ∈ (F D
b ,F D] would be acceptable
to a borrower who does not know the lender’s signal (since F ≤ F D) but reduces
the welfare of bad prospects (since F > F D
b ). Likewise, good types may suﬀer if
F D
g < F < F D
b . So these relative values are crucial to predation, and straightforward
manipulation of equation (2) implies that they turn on the sign of H − (L + S):
Lemma 1 F D
g > F D > F D
b if H > L + S, F D
g = F D = F D
b if H = L + S, and
F D
b > F D > F D
g if H < L + S.
So better prospects have the higher tolerance for promised repayments when their
collateral is worth more than the loan’s payoﬀ, and worse prospects have the higher
tolerance when it is worth less. This is a natural consequence of the better prospects
having the lower chance of losing the collateral, and the worse prospects having the
lower chance of making the repayment.
Lenders’ Break-even Face Values and their Properties
If the lender makes a loan with face value F then in the high-income state he gets
F and in the low income state he gets H − X if H − X < F and F otherwise.
Thus, if we let F C be the lowest face value acceptable to the creditor when lending
is unconditional on the signal, then F C solves10
pF






9Note that the condition H −(L + S) < pX is equivalent to H −X < F when F =
L+S−(1−p)H
p .
Also, FD can alternatively be written as F D = max
n
L+S−(1−p)H
p ,L + S − (1 − p)X
o
.





p if H − X < L
L otherwise
(4)
Likewise, let F C
b and F C
g denote the lowest face values acceptable after observing
signals b and g respectively; algebraically they take the same form as expression (4),
with p simply replaced by pb and pg respectively.
It is immediate that F C
b > F C > F C
g when H − X < L, i.e., the loan is undercollat-
eralized, and F C
b = F C = F C
g otherwise. Thus, any loan that is proﬁtable to make
after a bad signal is also proﬁtable after a good signal, while the reverse need not be
true.
Relation between Lenders’ and Borrowers’ Break-even Face Values
How do these break-even conditions relate to eﬃciency and predation? Eﬃciency is
simple. Bearing in mind that the lenders’ break-even face values are lower bounds
and the borrowers’ break-even face values are upper bounds, it is straightforward
that if lending is socially ineﬃcient then the lenders’ and borrowers’ break-even face
values, conditional on the same information, must not overlap. In fact, this is not
only suﬃcient but necessary:
Lemma 2 F C > F D if and only if S < (1 − p)X, and F C
σ > F D
σ if and only if
S < (1 − pσ)X.
How do they relate to predation? As we discussed in the introduction, predation can
arise only in a pooling equilibrium with lending. In turn, a pooling equilibrium with
lending can arise only if F C
b ≤ F D, as follows. On the one hand, the borrower would
not accept an oﬀer F > F D unless he learns the lender’s information, which he does
not in a pooling equilibrium. On the other hand, if a pooling equilibrium were to
feature F < F C
b the lender would be losing money after seeing the bad signal, and
would prefer not to lend.
With the functional forms of F C
b and F D we can identify the subset of the parameter
space where this holds. A necessary condition for F C
b ≤ F D is F C ≤ F D, which is







11simply the condition that uninformed lending be socially eﬃcient, i.e. X ≤ S/(1−p).
If a loan of L can be fully collateralized, i.e. H ≥ L + X, then F C
b = F C and so
this condition is also suﬃcient. If a loan of L cannot be fully collateralized, i.e.
H < L+ X, and therefore the creditor must collect more than L in the income state
to oﬀset his loss in the no-income state, then F C
b = (L − (1 − pb)(H − X))/pb and
F D = (L + S − (1 − p)H)/p.12 Note that as H decreases, F C
b increases at the rate
(1 − pb)/pb whereas F D increases at the slower rate (1 − p)/p. This is because the
debtor with bad prospects exchanges too little income-state payoﬀ for a unit of no-
income-state payoﬀ, valuing the former at p > pb and the latter at (1−p) < (1−pb).
The lender trades these states at the right price. Since F C
b increases with X, this
implies that the range of X satisfying F C
b ≤ F D shrinks as H decreases. Formally,
we have:
Lemma 3 F C
b ≤ F D if and only if
X ≤ ¯ X ≡ min
￿







For predation after signal σ to be strong we need the additional condition that F D
σ <
F C
σ . So if F D
σ < F C
σ ≤ F then strong predation after signal σ is possible, but if
F C
σ ≤ F D
σ ≤ F then only weak predation is possible.
We now have what we need to ﬁnd the equilibria.
Pooling Equilibria with Lending
Given our assumptions about the borrower’s rationality, predatory lending can arise
in our model only if, in equilibrium, the borrower fails to learn the lender’s informa-
tion about him. That is, predation is inherently a pooling equilibrium phenomenon.
Moreover, borrowers with good and bad prospects cannot simultaneously be victims
of predatory lending.
In this subsection we analyze the incidence of pooling equilibria with lending, and
then inspect these equilibria for predation. In the subsection following we address
the incidence of separating and no-lending equilibria.
12Observe that when X ≤ S/(1 − p) then H − (L + S) < pX whenever H − L < X.
12The complete set of pooling equilibria with lending turns out to correspond precisely
to the restriction X ≤ ¯ X. By Lemma 3, the necessity of this restriction is straight-
forward; to reiterate, any pooling equilibrium with lending needs F C
b ≤ F D because
if F > F D then borrowers would not accept, and the lender would not oﬀer F < F C
b
after observing σ = b.
For suﬃciency it is enough to show that F C
b ≤ F D implies at least one pooling
equilibrium. Consider the case H > L + S, under which (by Lemma 1) F D
b < F D <
F D
g ; so there exists an F such that F D ≥ F ≥ F D
b and F ≥ F C
b . If borrowers believe
that the creditor oﬀers F after either signal and they believe suﬃciently strongly that
any out-of-equilibrium oﬀer higher than F implies σ = b, then the creditor is best
oﬀ oﬀering F and the borrowers accept.13 Parallel arguments apply for H ≤ L + S.
Thus, we have:
Proposition 1 A pooling equilibrium with lending at face value F exists if and only









,F D]. This range is non-empty precisely when
X ≤ ¯ X.
It can be easily veriﬁed that all of the equilibrium outcomes identiﬁed by the above
proposition satisfy the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps [6]. Moreover, the pooling
equilibrium outcome that involves the highest F, F = F D, is the unique perfect
sequential equilibrium outcome.14
Do the pooling equilibria of Proposition 1 entail predation, and if so, of what form?
By deﬁnition, predation of bad prospects — weak or strong — requires F > F D
b . We
also know from the proposition above that, in the space of pooling equilibria, F > F D
b
requires F D > F D
b , which corresponds to H > L+S.15 Thus, we have a corollary to
Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 An equilibrium with predation of bad prospects exists if and only if X ≤
¯ X and H > L + S.
13Conversely, there is no pooling equilibrium in which with F < F D
b . For in this case, the





. The borrower will accept such an oﬀer regardless of
his out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Consequently, ˜ F represents a proﬁtable deviation for the creditor.
14A proof is available from the authors.
15Conversely, if H > L + S then F D
b < FD < FD
g , and so provided X ≥ ¯ X there exists a pooling
equilibrium with F > FD
b .
13Is this strong predation that hurts society’s wealth, or is it weak predation that
redistributes the borrower’s wealth to the lender? From Lemma 2, this depends on
whether F C
b is greater or less, respectively, than F D
b , or equivalently, whether X is
greater or less than S/(1 − pb):
Corollary 2 An equilibrium with strong predation of bad types exists if and only if
S/(1 − pb) < X ≤ ¯ X and H > L + S. An equilibrium with weak predation of bad
prospects exists if and only if X ≤ min{ ¯ X,S/(1 − pb)} and H > L + S.
We can see already that if H > L + S and lending to bad prospects is strictly
socially eﬃcient, then no other type of equilibrium exists. Observe that in any
separating equilibrium at most one of the oﬀers is accepted — since if both were
accepted, there would be no reason for the lender ever to propose the lower of the
face values. However, nor is there an equilibrium in which lending occurs after
just one of the signal realizations: since lending to bad prospects is strictly socially
eﬃcient, F C
g ≤ F C
b < F D
b , and so the oﬀer ˜ F = F D
b − ε is strictly preferred to not
lending.16 Finally, for the same reason no-lending cannot be an equilibrium either.
Formally,
Corollary 3 If X ≤ ¯ X, X < S/(1 − pb) and H > L + S then the only equilibria
are pooling equilibria where the lender’s oﬀer is F ∈ [F D
b ,F D]. Of these, all except
F = F D
b feature weak predation of bad prospects.
When H > L+S and lending to bad prospects is socially ineﬃcient, other equilibria
may exist (see below). However, every pooling equilibrium necessarily entails strong
predation of bad prospects:
Corollary 4 If S/(1 − pb) < X ≤ ¯ X and H > L + S then every pooling equilibrium
features strong predation of bad prospects.
Turning now to the case in which H < L + S, any predation must be at the expense
of borrowers with good prospects. However, strong predation only ever aﬀects bad
prospects, and never good prospects. To see this, simply observe that if a loan to
16Since FD
b < FD
g when H > L + S, the borrower will accept the oﬀer ˜ F < FD
b regardless of his
beliefs.
14good prospects is socially ineﬃcient, then so is a loan to bad prospects, and so no
pooling equilibrium can exist.17
We collect these observations regarding the predation of good prospects into the
following corollary, along with the analogous uniqueness result to Corollary 3 (the
proof of which is given in the appendix):
Corollary 5
1. An equilibrium with predation of good prospects exists if and only if X ≤ ¯ X and
H < L + S.
2. When it occurs, predation against good prospects is always weak.
3. When X ≤ ¯ X, H < L + S and X <
(pg−pb)(H−L)+pbS
pg(1−pb) , all equilibria are pooling
equilibria. Of these, all except F = F D
g feature weak predation of good prospects.
Figure 1 shows how the three forms of predation divide the parameter space. Collat-
eral value H is on the horizontal axis, and social cost of foreclosure X on the vertical.
To interpret the graph, recall that when H is high and loans can be fully collateral-
ized, the requirement X ≤ ¯ X coincides with the social eﬃciency condition X ≤ S
1−p.
On the other hand, when H is lower then predation can only occur when the social
loss associated with liquidation is also lower. The condition X ≤ ¯ X is represented
by the lower envelope of the two bold lines.
The dashed horizontal line separates the region where lending to bad prospects is
socially eﬃcient (below) from the region where it is socially ineﬃcient (above). Thus,
under the lower envelope of the bold lines we see the three regions: weak predation of
good types to the left of H = L + S, and predation of bad types to the right, strong
above S/(1 − pb) and weak below.
The ﬁgure summarizes our results so far. Predatory lending requires suﬃciently low
social cost of foreclosure, and predation of bad prospects also requires high collater-
alization. As collateralization decreases, repayment shifts toward the income state,
thereby shifting the harm to good prospects. Socially destructive predation of bad
prospects is possible if collateralization and social cost of foreclosure are high enough;
everybody could be better oﬀ in this situation if lenders could commit not to lend
17Formally, if a loan to good prospects is socially ineﬃcient, then F C
g > FD
g , which implies
FC
b ≥ FC > FD.





























Weak predation of borrowers with signal g
Strong predation of borrowers with signal b
Weak predation of borrowers with signal b
Figure 1: Pooling equilibrium under monopolistic lending
16after σ = b, but without a commitment device, their incentives not to lend are too
weak when collateral is high.
To summarize, we ﬁnd pooling equilibria that admit predation of both good and bad
prospects, depending on collateral and social cost of foreclosure. We conclude this
subsection with a brief discussion of comparative statics. First, observe that predatory
lending cannot arise if the foreclosure cost X is very high. The reason is simple: if X
is high, the lender recovers very little in foreclosure, and consequently is not prepared
to lend to borrowers with bad prospects. Nonetheless, moderate foreclosure costs are
entirely compatible with predation. That is, a lender is prepared to extend credit
to an individual with little chance of repaying even if the costs of foreclosing are
signiﬁcant.
Turning to the eﬀects of H and L:
Corollary 6 If H −L > S (respectively, H −L < S) then any predation is predation
of bad prospects (respectively, good prospects). For a given set of parameters, if there
exists an equilibrium with predatory lending for house and loan value H and L then
there exists an equilibrium with predatory lending whenever the house and loan values
H′ and L′ are such that S  = H′ − L′ > H − L.
The ﬁrst part of this result follows immediately from Corollary 1; the second part is
an implication of Lemma 3. Greater collateralization, as measured by H −L — small
loans against valuable houses — fosters predation, and in particular predation of bad
prospects.
Corollary 7 For given H and L, if there exists an equilibrium with predatory lending
when the surplus is S then there exists an equilibrium with predatory lending whenever
the surplus S′ is such that H − L  = S′ > S.
This result follows immediately from Lemma 3. Again, to a large extent it conforms
with conventional wisdom concerning predatory lending: the individuals most at risk
are those who attach a high value to being able to borrow. That said, it is worth
noting that an increase in S can move us from an area of the parameter space in
which predation is against bad prospects to one in which it is against good prospects.
The reason is that an increase in S is in many ways akin to a reduction in H − L,
which, as we have just seen, is associated with predation of good prospects.
17Finally, what happens as the lender’s informational quality increases, i.e., as pg in-
creases and pb decreases? Here two considerations are important. On the one hand,
predation becomes harder to support. The reason is clear: predation arises only if
the price at which the lender is prepared to supply funds to bad prospects is lower
than the price that an uninformed borrower is willing to pay. As pb decreases the
lender becomes less willing to lend to bad prospects.
On the other hand, as the lender’s information quality increases the “crime” that the
lender is guilty of grows more serious. Recall that we have deﬁned a predatory loan
as one in which the lender knowingly makes a borrower worse oﬀ. As the lender’s
information improves the size of the expected welfare reduction likewise grows.
Other Equilibria
To this point we have characterized all the pooling equilibria with lending, and iden-
tiﬁed a region of the parameter space, i.e., H > L + S and X < S/(1 − pb), that
admits only this type of equilibrium. In this subsection we consider the other possible
types: pooling without lending, and lending only to good prospects.
Equilibria without lending are not particularly interesting, but for completeness it
is worth mentioning that they are possible when lending after signal b is socially
ineﬃcient. In such equilibria the borrowers reject the equilibrium oﬀers, and interpret
any deviations as coming from a lender who has observed the signal σ such that
F D
σ < F D, and so reject these deviations also. However, provided that lending after
signal σ = g is socially eﬃcient, these equilibria are not very robust. In particular,
under a slight perturbation of our model to one in which there is a small cost γ of
making an oﬀer, the no-lending equilibrium would fail the intuitive criterion.18
Of more interest are equilibria with lending to only good prospects. If H > L+S but
lending after σ = b is socially ineﬃcient, though lending after σ = g is still socially
eﬃcient, then separating equilibria are possible:
18A proof is available from the authors upon request. For a rough intuition, take the case where
H > L+ S and consider an oﬀer by the lender after signal g of ˜ F = F D
b −δ, where δ is small. The
signal g lender could argue: “Borrower, you should infer from this that I observed σ = g, since if I
had instead observed σ = b I will lose money on this loan, and so would have no incentive to try to
convince you that I instead observed σ = g.” Provided the borrower ﬁnds this speech convincing,
he will accept the oﬀer ˜ F, giving the lender positive proﬁts. A similar argument applies in the case
H < L + S.
18Proposition 2 If H > L+S and lending after the good signal is socially eﬃcient but
lending after the bad signal is socially ineﬃcient, i.e. S
1−pb < X ≤ S
1−pg, then there ex-









after observing σ = g, and Fb  = Fg such that Fb > F D
b after observing σ = b; and in
which the borrower accepts Fg but rejects Fb. There are no other separating equilibria
in which lending occurs.
In these equilibria, all the positive-NPV loans are made, and all the negative-NPV
loans are not, an appealing outcome. However, it is worth noting that with the
exception of the equilibrium with Fg = min{F D
g ,F C
b }, the separating equilibrium of
Proposition 2 are not at all robust. Speciﬁcally, consider a separating equilibrium
with Fg < min{F D
g ,F C
b }. To support this equilibrium, the borrower must interpret






as coming from a lender who has
observed σ = b. However, since ˜ F < F C
b , this means the borrower believes a lender is
oﬀering a loss-making loan. This is clearly a problematic assumption to make. More
precisely, under the small oﬀer-cost perturbation of the model discussed above, no
separating equilibrium with Fg < min{F D
g ,F C
b } satisﬁes the intuitive criterion (the
intuition is similar to footnote 18 above).
We turn now to separating equilibria when H < L + S.
Proposition 3 If H < L + S, and lending after the good signal is socially eﬃcient,
X ≤ S
1−pg, and moreover X ≥
(pg−pb)(H−L)+pbS
pg(1−pb) , then there exist separating equilibria
in which the lender oﬀers Fg = F D
g after observing σ = g, and Fb  = Fg such that
Fb > F D
b after observing σ = b; and in which the borrower accepts Fg but rejects Fb.
There are no other separating equilibria in which lending occurs.
In this case, all loans that are made are positive-NPV but if lending to bad prospects
is socially eﬃcient then some positive-NPV loans are not made. Lending after the bad
signal does not occur even if it is socially eﬃcient because the deviating oﬀer would
have to lie between F C
b > Fg and F D
b < Fb, and the borrower’s out-of-equilibrium
beliefs associate such a deviation with σ = g.
194 Competition
As discussed, predatory lending is often attributed to monopolistic lending practices.
In this section we explore whether or not predatory lending can occur in environments
with several competing lenders. For conciseness we focus on the case in which any
predation is at the expense of bad prospects. From Corollary 1 we know that this
is equivalent to the parameter condition H > L + S. It would be straightforward to
extend our analysis to cover the case H < L + S.
Formally, we extend our model to one with n identical lenders. The number of
lenders n should be thought of as indexing the degree of competition, with larger
values corresponding to ﬁercer competition.
We assume that all lenders receive the same signal σ about the borrower. This
is consistent with our main interpretations about the source of the lender’s infor-
mational advantage (see earlier). After observing the signal, each of the n lenders
simultaneously announces the face value at which they are willing to lend to the
borrower.
Throughout, we restrict attention to symmetric (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. We adopt the standard assumption that if a borrower receives an identical
oﬀer from k diﬀerent lenders, and chooses to accept this oﬀer, than the probability
that he accepts a loan from each individual lender is 1/k.
A Benchmark Competitive Equilibrium
A natural equilibrium to consider under competition is that in which lenders oﬀer to
provide funds at marginal cost, and make zero proﬁts. That is, lenders oﬀer F C
g after
σ = g and F C
b after σ = b:
Proposition 4 If H−L < X (and so F C
b > F C
g ) then it is an equilibrium for lenders
to oﬀer F C
σ after σ = b,g, and for the borrower to accept F C
σ if F D
σ ≥ F C
σ .
If H − L ≥ X (and so F C = F C
b = F C
g ) and X ≤ S
1−p, then it is an equilibrium for
lenders to oﬀer F C after both σ = g,b, and for the borrower to accept.
20Predation under Competition
Is predation possible under competition? That is, is there a pooling equilibrium in
which lenders oﬀer F > F D
b ? It turns out there are two separate cases to consider:
First, suppose that F D
b > F C
g . This condition is obviously satisﬁed if lending after
a bad signal is socially eﬃcient (F D
b > F C
b ), and even if lending after a bad signal is
socially ineﬃcient, it will still often be satisﬁed.
When this condition holds, no predation is possible when the degree of competition
is large enough. This can be easily seen as follows.
Suppose to the contrary that equilibria with predation exist even as n grows arbitrarily
large. That is, for n large there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the equilibrium
face value F exceeds F D
b . The probability that each lender’s oﬀer F is accepted, 1/n,
converges to 0 as n grows large. Consequently, even conditional on observing a good
signal each lender’s payoﬀ from oﬀering F shrinks to 0 as n → ∞.








sees signal g. Since ˜ F < F D
b , a borrower will accept this oﬀer regardless of his oﬀ-
equilibrium path beliefs. Moreover, the borrower will accept this oﬀer in preference
to the n−1 other oﬀers of F. Finally, since F D
b > F C
g the lender’s proﬁts under this
deviation are bounded away from 0. But this contradicts the observation above that
each lender’s equilibrium proﬁts converge to 0.
The above argument establishes:
Proposition 5 Suppose that H > L + S. If F D
b > F C
g then there exists an ˆ n such
that predatory lending does not exist in any equilibrium when n > ˆ n.
The second case to consider is that in which F D
b ≤ F C
g . Under such parameter
conﬁgurations pooling (and thus predatory lending) equilibria exist under any degree




there is a pooling equilibrium in
which all lenders oﬀer F regardless of the signal observed, and the borrower accepts.
Once again, this is straightforward to see. Since both lenders and the borrower all
have weakly positive payoﬀs under the behavior described, it suﬃces to check that
no lender has a proﬁtable deviation available. But for this, just note that clearly no
oﬀer ˜ F > F will be accepted; while if borrowers interpret oﬀers ˜ F < F as indicating
21that the signal was b, then no oﬀer ˜ F > F D
b will be accepted. Finally, oﬀers ˜ F ≤ F D
b
are unproﬁtable even if they are accepted, since by assumption F D
b ≤ F C
g .
Thus we have established:
Proposition 6 If F D
b ≤ F C




there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all lenders oﬀer F regardless of the signal
observed, and the borrower accepts. There are no other pooling equilibria in which
lending occurs. Except for the case in which F C
b = F C
g = F D
b , all of these equilibria
entail predation of bad prospects.
When lending following a bad signal destroys suﬃcient value, then predatory lending
cannot be precluded in equilibrium by competition. However, when loans cannot be
fully collateralized, i.e. H − L < X, the plausibility of these equilibria is weak, as
follows.
When H −L < X then F C
g < F C
b . In this case, no equilibrium with F > F C
b satisﬁes
the intuitive criterion. A rough argument is as follows.19 Instead of making the
equilibrium oﬀer F, a lender always has the option of undercutting the competition






. If accepted, this will generate higher proﬁts when
competition is ﬁerce (n large). So to support an equilibrium with F > F C
b , the
borrower must believe that some lenders make a loss-making oﬀer ˜ F < F C
b after
seeing σ = b. By a similar argument, the remaining possibility F = F C
b fails the
intuitive criterion in the small oﬀer-cost perturbation of the model that we have
discussed previously.
One of the main messages delivered by our model is that predatory lending at the
expense of borrowers with bad prospects is fundamentally associated with high col-
lateral values. The above discussion only serves to reinforce this conclusion.
Corollary 8 The only circumstances under which predation of bad prospects is a
robust equilibrium phenomenon under arbitrarily ﬁerce competition is when loans can
be fully collateralized, i.e., H − L ≥ X.
19A full proof is available from the authors.
225 Home-Improvement and House Purchase Loans
In our benchmark model, we assumed that the borrower spent the loan L on con-
sumption generating a surplus of L+S. Importantly, while the borrower’s house can
be seized in the event of default, his consumption of L + S cannot be. However, in
practice loans made for the purposes of house purchase and home-improvement ﬁgure
prominently in criticisms of sub-prime lending practices. In this section we extend
our basic model and argue that this focus is well-founded.
Home-Improvement Loans
We start by analyzing home-improvement loans. We consider the following variant
of our model. Instead of spending the loan L on consumption, the borrower spends
the loan to increase his personal valuation of his home from H to H + ∆H, and to
increase the bank’s recovery in foreclosure from H −X to H +∆H −X −∆X. The
borrower’s expected utility from taking the loan is now
p(H + ∆H + I − F) + (1 − p)max{H + ∆H − X − ∆X − F,0},
while his expected utility if he does not take the loan is simply H + pI. Similarly,
the lender’s expected payoﬀ from making a loan is
pF + (1 − p)min{H + ∆H − X − ∆X,F}.
The key diﬀerences with respect to our standard model are that now the beneﬁt to
the loan is ∆H instead of L+S, the borrower loses this beneﬁt in the event of default,
and an additional ∆H − ∆X is available for the lender to recover.
Parallel to before, straightforward algebra implies that the highest face value an




∆H − (1 − p)(X + ∆X) if H ≥ p(X + ∆X)
p∆H−(1−p)H
p otherwise





L if H + ∆H − X − ∆X ≥ L
L−(1−pb)(H+∆H−X−∆X)
pb otherwise.
23Our main result is that, other things equal, a home-improvement loan is more likely
to allow predatory lending than a loan made for consumption purposes. By “other
things equal” we mean that the home-improvement loan generates the same surplus
to the borrower in the non-default state, ∆H = L + S, and that the wedge between
the borrower’s and lender’s valuations of the house remains unchanged, ∆X = 0.
Proposition 7 Suppose ∆H = L + S and ∆X = 0. Then ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D whenever
F C
b ≤ F D, while the reverse is not true.
That is, if predatory lending is a possible equilibrium outcome for a consumption
loan, it is for a home-improvement loan also (all else remaining equal).
House Purchase Loans
We turn now to loans made for the purposes of house purchase. Observe ﬁrst that in
our benchmark model such loans cannot possibly be predatory. If a borrower begins
without a house, then in the zero-income state his utility from taking the loan is 0.20
On the other hand, taking the loan must weakly improve the borrower’s welfare in
the state where his income is I > 0, for otherwise he would not take the loan at all.
Given this, there is no way for taking the loan to make the borrower worse oﬀ.
To allow for the possibility of predatory lending in this context, then, we must change
our model to one in which the borrower’s utility in the low-income state is aﬀected by
whether or not he takes the loan. One possibility would be to extend the model to
cover more than one period, which would allow the borrower to derive surplus from
living in his house before it is repossessed.21 A second possibility, which is the one






This model is in fact isomorphic to the home-improvement model we developed
immediately above: simply take I′
1 = H, I′
2 = L + H, let the borrower’s valu-
ation of the house be H′ = ∆H, and let the lender’s valuation of the house be
H′ − X′ = ∆H − X − ∆X.
20The only case where this would not be true is if H − X > L. However, in this case the lender
would prefer to buy the house directly.
21A model of this type is available from the authors upon request.
22We assume that I′
1 < L, so that as in the benchmark model the borrower defaults in the
low-income state.
24By the same logic as Proposition 7, we can conclude that other things equal loans
made for the purpose of house purchase are more exposed to predation than con-
sumption loans backed by housing equity.
6 Policy Experiments
Consumers borrow in the context of considerable state and federal regulation. Some
of this regulation originated in predatory-lending concerns, and some in other con-
cerns. In this section we consider the equilibrium eﬀects of three high-proﬁle reg-
ulations: state-level legislation aimed at combatting predatory lending, the Federal
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Federal Community Reinvestment Act.
Interest-Rate Constraints
There are two groups of laws constraining consumer-loan pricing: usury laws, which
date back centuries, and more recent laws explicitly aimed at combatting predatory
lending. Usury laws are hard constraints on interest rates, whereas the predatory-
lending laws are, to some extent, soft constraints. The standard form of predatory
lending laws is two-part: loans with suﬃciently high interest rates or fees are labeled
“high-cost,” and then the form of high-cost loans is tightly restricted.23 The reg-
ulators’ motive appears to be concern that the restricted features exploit borrower
confusion, which is outside our model. But to the extent the restrictions discourage
loans that trigger them, they are soft constraints on interest rates, which we can an-
alyze.24 Since these laws speciﬁcally target abusive lending, their equilibrium eﬀect
on predation is especially relevant to our analysis. For conciseness, we analyze only
23See, for example, the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law of 1999, widely regarded as
the model for other states’ laws. Loans of no more than $300,000 with interest rates at least
8 percent above Treasuries are considered high cost, and with high-cost loans there can be no
call provision, balloon payment, negative amortization, interest-rate increase after default, ad-
vance payments or modiﬁcation or deferral fees. Furthermore, there can be no lending with-
out home-ownership counseling, or without due regard to repayment ability (though repay-
ment ability is presumed if the borrower’s debt payments are ≤50% of his current income) (see
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/longsumm.pdf) The Federal Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994 is similar.
24There is evidence that anti-predatory lending laws have indeed reduced the volume of high-cost
loans. See, e.g., Ernst, Farris and Stein [10], Elliehausen and Staten [9], and Quercia, Stegman and
Davis [24], which debate the eﬀect of North Carolina’s recent anti-predatory lending law.
25the region of the parameter space where predation of bad prospects is possible, i.e.,
H > L + S and X ≤ ¯ X.
In some respects, the eﬀects of putting a cap on the interest rate that a monopolist can
charge are standard. If the cap is high it has no eﬀect. If it is very low it eliminates
the market. For some levels in between, the eﬀect of the cap is to reduce the interest
rate charged, while leaving the basic structure of the equilibrium unchanged — i.e.,
a straightforward wealth transfer from the lender to the borrower. In Appendix B







, where the eﬀects are less standard.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which lending to bad prospects is socially eﬃcient, i.e.
F D
b > F C
b . From Corollary 3 we know that, absent the interest rate cap, the only
equilibria are pooling equilibria. In contrast, after the cap is introduced the creditor
is no longer prepared to lend after observed σ = b, and so a pooling equilibrium
no longer exists. Instead, there is a unique separating equilibrium in which the
lender oﬀers Fg = ¯ F to good prospects, and they accept. Consequently the cap has
eliminated predation of bad prospects while preserving lending to good prospects.
However, overall social surplus is reduced, since the predatory loans to bad prospects
were socially eﬃcient.
Next, consider the case in which lending to bad prospects is socially ineﬃcient, i.e.
F D
b < F C
b . Absent the interest cap there exist both pooling equilibria featuring
predation, and separating equilibria in which good prospects receive loans. As above,
the interest cap eliminates the pooling equilibrium, and leaves only a separating
equilibrium in which the lender oﬀers Fg = ¯ F to good prospects. Again, the cap has
eliminated predation of bad prospects while preserving lending to good prospects.
This time, though, overall social surplus is also increased.
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
In the words of the oﬃcial website, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)
“is intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of
the communities in which they operate.”25 It operates by tracking banks’ local credit
provision, and weighing it when considering applications for deposit facilities.26 Thus,
the CRA adds a beneﬁt to local lending, which amounts in our model to lowering
25www.ﬃec.gov/cra/history.htm
26Ibid.
26banks’ break-even expected returns below zero.
This law is not a response to predatory lending but, as others have noted,27 it may
have unintended consequences in that direction. To the extent it succeeds, the CRA
induces lenders to provide credit to communities they previously ignored. By our
analysis, the consequences of predation depend on whether other lenders are already
active locally. If not, then the CRA delivers the monopoly case and its associated
dangers of predation. But if other banks are already lending then the CRA creates
or increases competition, and therefore tends to decrease predation.
It is notable that this decrease in predation could involve a decrease in total lending;
if lending to bad prospects is socially ineﬃcient, then (see Proposition 5) it may arise
under monopoly but not competition. So the CRA could reduce lending, which seems
contrary to the spirit of the law but is actually beneﬁcial to the aﬀected borrowers.
Similarly, while it may be most desirable to foster lending where none exists, this is
when the danger of inadvertently fostering predation is greatest.
All of these eﬀects are subject to the caveat that the informational advantage of a
lender just starting to lend to a community is likely to start small and then grow with
experience.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 (amended 1976) combats dis-
criminatory lending. In particular, it “prohibits creditors from discriminating against
credit applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital sta-
tus, age, or because an applicant receives income from a public assistance program.”28
This law is not about predatory lending but could be relevant to it nonetheless. To
the extent that the lender’s signal about future income correlates with one of these
partitions, the ECOA prevents him from conditioning on it. To gauge the eﬀect on
predation, we impose this constraint on our model.
Suppose the model’s b and g now stand for blue and green, respectively, and the
lender’s private information is that blue borrowers are more likely to have low incomes
in the future. That is, observing that a borrower is blue is akin to observing σ = b
in our model. However, whether a consumer is blue or green is publicly observable
27For example, Marisco [21].
28See www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/housing ecoa.htm.
27and veriﬁable. Finally, suppose that the ECOA obliges the lender not to condition
on blue vs. green, so his oﬀer must be either the same F to both or no F at all.
If the lender is a monopolist, it is easily seen that the regulation expands the incidence
of predation. Without the regulation, we know that predation can arise if and only
if F C
b ≤ F D. But with the regulation forcing the same oﬀer to both types, the only
equilibrium with lending is that in which the lender oﬀers F D, and it exists if and
only if F C ≤ F D. And aside from the knife-edge case H = L + S, the equilibrium is
necessarily predatory for either blue or green. The predatory region of the parameter
space has annexed the region where F C ≤ F D < F C
b because while the creditor would
rather not lend after σ = b, he is willing to pay this price for the right to proﬁt after
σ = g.
More striking, perhaps, is that under some circumstances in which competition elimi-
nates predatory lending, ECOA-style regulation can allow predation to survive. When
lenders compete subject to this regulation, lending at a face value F > F C cannot
occur in equilibrium, because any one lender can slightly undercut and capture the
whole market. There is no longer any disincentive to undercut provided by borrowers’
oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs about σ, because the regulation removes all information about
σ from the oﬀer. Thus the only equilibrium with lending after either signal is at a
face value of F C, and this equilibrium exists whenever F C ≤ F D. This is predatory
if either F D
b or F D
g is strictly below F C.29
To summarize, laws against discriminatory lending can have an unintended adverse
consequence. The incidence of welfare-reducing lending can rise, even under arbitrar-
ily stiﬀ competition.
7 Conclusion
Consumers tend to borrow from very active creditors with long and wide experi-
ence. It is therefore likely that creditors have private information about borrowers’
prospects. Starting from this observation, we provide both a deﬁnition and a working
model of predatory lending.
Overall, our analysis associates predatory lending with monopolistic lending and high
collateral values. Loans for creating collateral, such as those for home purchase and
improvement, are particularly susceptible. Competition generally ameliorates preda-
29Appendix C gives a numerical example.
28tion, but loans that are fully collateralized continue to risk predation when lending
to borrowers with bad prospects is socially ineﬃcient.
In an ideal world, predatory lending of the form predicted by our model would be
eliminated if lenders were forced to disclose their private information to borrowers.
For example, one can imagine a law that stipulates that loan documents include a
statement of the form: “Our experience indicates that borrowers who share your
characteristics default on their loans with a probability of 20 percent.” Of course,
whether or not such a regulation is actually enforceable is a quite diﬀerent matter.
In practice, the main legislative response to predatory lending has been to subject
high-interest consumer loans to tight scrutiny; and legal constraints are placed on
the use of an assortment of practices, such as balloon payments, which legislators
believe facilitate predation. To the extent to which these constraints function as a
soft interest-rate ceiling, our model predicts that such legislation can be eﬀective in
reducing the incidence of predation. It is worth reiterating, however, that successful
implementation of such a policy requires that the implicit interest-rate ceiling is set
neither too high, nor too low.
Another regulation, the Community Reinvestment Act, serves other purposes but
we ﬁnd that it relates to predation as well, both positively and negatively. If it
increases competition then it generally reduces both the incidence of predation and
the volume of lending. But if it produces a monopoly lender then it can increase both
the incidence of predation and the volume of lending. This means that the initial
conditions of the community are key to the eﬀect of the CRA on predation, and it
also means that a reduction in lending could indicate a positive outcome.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act combats discrimination, but its direct positive
eﬀect may compete with an unintended indirect negative eﬀect. To the extent the
prohibited dimensions of discrimination correspond to the dimensions of lenders’ pri-
vate signals, the prohibition may cause predation, even under strong competition.
The magnitudes of these regulatory eﬀects are a promising area for future research.
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32A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3
Observe that
¯ X ≡ min
￿














First, consider the case in which H − L ≥ S
1−p and so ¯ X = S
1−p. Consequently, if
X ≤ ¯ X = S
1−p then (i) the loan can be fully collateralized, so F C
b = F C, and (ii)
F C ≤ F D. Consequently F C
b ≤ F D. Conversely, if X > ¯ X then F C
b ≥ F C > F D.
Second, consider the case in which H − L <
S
1−p and so ¯ X =
(p−pb)(H−L)+pbS
p(1−pb) . As a
preliminary, observe that in this range









as follows. The condition H − L <
S
1−p is equivalent to max
n
H−L−S
p ,H − L
o
=
H − L. Moreover, if H − L < S
1−p then
(p − pb)(H − L) + pbS
p(1 − pb)
− (H − L) =
−pb (1 − p)(H − L) + pbS
p(1 − pb)
> 0.
Given inequality (5), if X > ¯ X then X > max
n
H−L−S
p ,H − L
o
. But for such values
the pooling condition F D ≥ F C
b is
L + S − (1 − p)H
p
≥





(p − pb)(H − L) + pbS
p(1 − pb)
= ¯ X.
Thus no pooling equilibrium exists.
On the other hand, if X ≤ ¯ X then since H − L < S
1−p, it follows that ¯ X =
(p−pb)(H−L)+pbS
p(1−pb) < S/(1 − p), and so F C ≤ F D. If X ≤ max
n
H−L−S
p ,H − L
o
=
33H − L then the loan is fully collateralized and so F C




p ,H − L
o
, then F C
b ≤ F D is equivalent to inequality (6), which
holds since X ≤ ¯ X.
Proof of Corollary 5
Throughout, we make use of the observation that since F D
g < F D
b , a borrower will
accept an oﬀer of ˜ F = F D
g − ε regardless of his beliefs.
First, observe that there can be no separating equilibrium in which only borrowers
with bad prospects receive a loan. For if this were the case, lending to bad prospects
would need to be weakly socially eﬃcient, and so lending to good prospects would be
strongly socially eﬃcient, i.e., F C
g < F D
g . But then the oﬀer ˜ F is a strictly proﬁtable
deviation for the lender after σ = g.
Second, if F C
b < F D
g then there is no equilibrium in which no lending occurs. This
is almost immediate: since F C
g ≤ F C
b < F D
g < F D
b , the oﬀer ˜ F is strictly proﬁtable
deviation for the lender after both signals.
Third, if F C
b < F D
g then there is no separating equilibrium in which only borrowers
with good prospects receive a loan. For suppose such an equilibrium existed, with
the good prospects receiving a loan with face value Fg. Clearly Fg ≤ F D
g . In fact, it
must be that Fg = F D
g , since otherwise the lender could proﬁtably deviate by oﬀering
˜ F. Finally, it must be that Fg ≥ F C
b , since otherwise the lender could proﬁtably
oﬀer Fg after observing σ = b.
The above establishes that when F C
b < F D
g the only equilibria are pooling. Finally,
by an argument exactly analogous to Lemma 3, the condition F C
b < F D
g is equivalent


















Proof of Proposition 2
First, note that F C
g ≤ F D
g given it is socially eﬃcient to lend after signal g. Further-
more, we know that F C
g ≤ F C
b and F D
b < F D
g . Finally, F D
b < F C
b by the assumption









b }] is non-empty.









Fb  = Fg and Fb ≥ F D
b , a separating equilibrium of the following form exists: the
lender oﬀers Fg and Fb after signals σ = g,b respectively, and the borrower accepts
the oﬀer Fg but rejects the oﬀer Fb. Since Fg ≤ F D
g and Fb ≥ F D
b , the borrower’s
strategy clearly constitutes a best response. For the lender, it is not proﬁtable to
oﬀer Fb after σ = g, since it is rejected while F ≥ F C
g is proﬁtable and is accepted;
and it is not proﬁtable to oﬀer Fg after σ = b, since F ≤ F C
b . It remains only
to consider lender deviations to oﬀers ˜ F / ∈ {Fb,Fg}. We assume that the borrower
believes out-of-equilibrium oﬀers of this type come only from a lender who has seen
a bad signal. Consequently, under these beliefs it is a best response for the borrower
to reject any oﬀer ˜ F ≥ F D
b . So the only oﬀers ˜ F / ∈ {Fb,Fg} that would be accepted
are those below F D
b . But since F D
b ≤ F the lender prefers to oﬀer Fg after σ = g.
Finally, after σ = b the lender prefers having the oﬀer Fb rejected to having an oﬀer
˜ F < F D
b ≤ F C
b accepted.
Finally, we argue there is no other separating equilibrium in which lending occurs.
If it is strictly socially ineﬃcient to lend after a bad signal, X > S
1−pb, then there
cannot be a separating equilibrium in which Fb is accepted. Therefore, in a separating
equilibrium in which lending occurs, it must be that Fg is accepted. Borrower






. Moreover, Fg ≤ F C
b since
otherwise the lender would deviate and oﬀer Fg after σ = b. Finally, we must
have F ≥ F D
b : for if instead F < F D






instead of Fg, since the borrower is sure to accept any oﬀer below F D
b .
Proof of Proposition 3
Observe ﬁrst that when H < L + S, the condition
(pg−pb)(H−L)+pbS
pg(1−pb) ≤ X is equivalent
to F D
g ≤ F C
b — see the proof of Corollary 5. From Corollary 5, we also know that if
(pg−pb)(H−L)+pbS
pg(1−pb) > X then no separating equilibrium exists.
Suppose now that
(pg−pb)(H−L)+pbS
pg(1−pb) ≤ X and so F D
g ≤ F C
b . We claim an equilibrium
exists in which the lender oﬀers Fg = F D
g after signal g and Fb > F D
b after signal b,
and the borrower accepts Fg but not Fb. Given the oﬀers, the borrower’s acceptance
behavior is clearly a best response. By construction, oﬀering Fg = F D
g is weakly
35proﬁtable for a lender who has seen g, but weakly unproﬁtable for a lender who has
seen b. Finally, if the borrower’s oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs are that an oﬀer above
F D
g comes from a lender who has observed the signal g, then no oﬀer higher than F D
g
will be accepted. Meanwhile, deviating to an oﬀer below F D
g is clearly unproﬁtable
for a lender who has seen g, and since F D
g ≤ F C
b is also unproﬁtable for a lender who
has seen b.
Proof of Proposition 4
By construction the borrower’s accept/reject decision is a best response, and the
lender makes zero proﬁts. If the lender deviates by oﬀering ˜ F > F C
σ after σ, the
borrower will reject the oﬀer since he has n−1 more attractive oﬀers to choose among.
Clearly no proﬁtable downwards deviations are possible.
Proof of Proposition 7
A numerical example suﬃces to establish that ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D can hold even when F C
b >
F D. Consider the following: L = $100K, H = $120K, X = $23K, I = $120K, S =
$14K, pg = 0.7, pb = 0.3, p = 0.4. Under these parameters, F D = max
￿
114 − 0.6 × 23, 114−0.6×120
0.4
￿







= $107K, so that F C
b > F D. On
the other hand, ˆ F D = max
￿
114 − 0.6 × 23, 0.4×114−0.6×120
0.4
￿








= $100K, so that ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D.
We next prove that whenever F C
b ≤ F D then ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D holds also. The proof
requires consideration of three distinct cases, each of which is straightforward:
Case: H − ∆H ≥ pX
Here, H ≥ pX also, so F D = ˆ F D = ∆H − (1 − p)X. Certainly ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F C
b (this is
strict if H + ∆H − X < L). So if F C
b ≤ F D then ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D also.
Case: H − ∆H < pX and H − X ≥ L
First, note that H ≥ pX; for if H < pX, then L ≤ H −X < 0. Second, observe that
certainly H + ∆H − X ≥ L. So ˆ F C
b = L and ˆ F D = ∆H − (1 − p)X. In this case,
36ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D holds since
L ≤ H − X = H − pX − (1 − p)X < ∆H − (1 − p)X.









L − (1 − pb)(H − X)
pb














D − ˆ F
D ≤
∆H − (1 − p)H
p
−








b − ˆ F
C
b
since pb < p. Thus ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D whenever F C
b ≤ F D.
If H + ∆H − X ≥ L and H < pX then ˆ F C
b = L and ˆ F D =
p∆H−(1−p)H
p , and so
ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D holds since
pL − p∆H ≤ p(H − X) < −(1 − p)H.
Finally, if H + ∆H − X ≥ L and H ≥ pX then
ˆ F




So we must show that if
L − (1 − pb)(H − X)
pb
≤
∆H − (1 − p)H
p
37then
L ≤ ∆H − (1 − p)X.
Rewriting the ﬁrst inequality,
pL ≤ pb∆H + (p − pb)H − p(1 − pb)X.
It is thus suﬃcient to show that
pb∆H + (p − pb)H − p(1 − pb)X ≤ p(∆H − (1 − p)X),
i.e.,
(p − pb)H + (pb − p)∆H ≤ (p(1 − pb) − p(1 − p))X,
i.e.,
H − ∆H ≤ pX,
which does indeed hold. So again, ˆ F C
b ≤ ˆ F D whenever F C
b ≤ F D.
38B Appendix: Analysis of the eﬀect of interest-rate
constraints
In the model, an interest-rate cap is an upper bound ¯ F on allowable face values.
We consider its eﬀect ﬁrst when lending to bad prospects is socially eﬃcient, i.e.
F D
b > F C
b . In this case we have F C
b < F D
b < F D, and (from Corollary 3) the only
equilibria are pooling equilibria with F ∈ [F D
b ,F D]. The question is what eﬀect ¯ F
has on the interest rate or on the type of equilibrium, and the answer depends on
which interval it falls in:
1. ¯ F > F D: The cap has no eﬀect.
2. F D > ¯ F > F D
b : The range of pooling equilibria shrinks to
￿
F D
b , ¯ F
￿
, but there
is no separating equilibrium.
3. F D
b > ¯ F > F C
b : There is a pooling equilibrium at ¯ F (but no others). There is
no separating equilibrium.
4. F C
b ≥ ¯ F ≥ F C
g : There is no pooling equilibrium. Instead there is a unique
separating equilibrium in which the lender oﬀers Fg = ¯ F to good prospects.
5. F C
g > ¯ F: There is no lending.
Now suppose lending after the bad signal b is socially ineﬃcient (F D
b < F C
b ). Absent






























(given our parameter assumptions) to good prospects.
The eﬀect of an interest rate cap on the pooling equilibria is as follows:
1. ¯ F > F D: The cap has no eﬀect.
2. F D > ¯ F > F C
b : The range of pooling equilibria shrinks to
￿
F C




b > ¯ F: There is no pooling equilibrium.
The eﬀect of an interest rate cap on the separating equilibria is as follows:
391. ¯ F > F C
b : The cap has no eﬀect.
2. F C






: The range of separating equilibria shrinks to ￿
F C




b ≥ ¯ F ≥ F C
g : There is a separating equilibrium at Fg = ¯ F.
4. F C
g > ¯ F: There is no lending.
40C Appendix: Numerical example illustrating the
potential eﬀects of ECOA
A borrower has a house he values at $120K but from which a lender would derive
only $97K in the event of foreclosure. He seeks a loan of $100K, from which he
will derive a net surplus of $15K. The income he has available for meeting the loan
repayments over the life of the loan is either I = $150K or $0K; the probability of
the former is given by pg = .7, p = 0.4, pb = .3.
Given these parameter values, F D = max
￿











= $107. Since F C
b < F D, predation of blue borrowers is




115 − .7 × 23, 115−.7×120
.3
￿






= $101.29. Since F C
g < F D
b , a suﬃcient degree of competition eliminates predatory
lending (see Proposition 5).






= $104.5. Since F D
b < F C < F D, predatory
lending occurs under the ECOA, even under competition.
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